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STRUGGLING WITH TEXT AND CONTEXT: 
A HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO 




Why do some law schools have missions that exist on paper 
but not in reality, while others have lived missions that do not 
match their written missions to one degree or another? It seems 
that some schools find it difficult to effectuate their missions in 
varying social and temporal contexts. l This article explores one 
possible method for understanding and addressing this 
phenomenon. It is intended to illuminate the interpretive 
difficulties that may occur when a law school with changing 
social, economic, and intellectual situations seeks to implement 
its stated mission over a period of time. This article will also 
address the often unstated impact those difficulties have on 
whether a school "lives" its mission, simply acknowledges it, or 
falls somewhere in between. Lastly, this discussion will focus on 
ways in which these interpretive difficulties can be overcome so 
that a law school can live its mission over time, without ignoring 
the realities facing the school, its faculty, administration, staff, 
and students. While the focus will be on religiously affiliated 
law schools, the suggestions contained herein are equally 
applicable to secular law schools struggling to follow their 
mission statements . 
• Visiting Associate Profesor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law (2001-
2002); Fulbright Scholar, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University (Spring/Summer 
2001); Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. 
1 One of the themes at the First Conference of the Religiously Affiliated Law 
Schools was the complex challenges these schools face both internally and 
externally in regard to their goals and missions. See generally Steven M. Barkan, 
The First Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools: An Overview, 78 MARQ. 
L. REv. 247 (1995). Moreover, through experience in academics, most of us are 
aware of a number of schools in this situation. 
731 
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Given the internal and external pressures facing law schools 
as we enter the new millennium, it is not surprising that some 
schools are not effectively carrying out their mission 
statements.2 This failure can be better understood and 
addressed through hermeneutic theory; more specifically, 
through the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, as augmented by the work of Paul Ricoeur.3 I have 
been working with hermeneutic theory recently in my research 
on the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and when 
thinking about this symposium, the potential relevance of that 
theory to law school mission statements was inescapable. 
For those not familiar with hermeneutic theory, this article 
will fIrst explain the basic concepts of that theory as understood 
by Gadamer and Ricoeur. Particular attention will be paid to 
the interplay between the text and the interpreter in the process 
of interpretation.4 Next, hermeneutic theory will be applied to 
suggest why some law schools are unable or unwilling to 
effectuate their written mission statements over time. Finally, 
2 See id. at 250-53. 
3 There are a number of primary and secondary texts that set forth and discuss 
Gadamerian hermeneutics. Perhaps most important is Gadamer's magnum opus, 
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall trans., The Crossroad Pub. Corp. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) [hereinafter 
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD]. Two of Gadamer's other works are worth 
consulting for a discussion on his approach to hermeneutics. See HANS-GEORG 
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed. & trans., Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1976) [hereinafter GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS]; HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 
The MIT Press 1981) (1979) [hereinafter GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF 
SCIENCE]. In addition to Gadamer's work, there are a number of valuable books that 
can serve as introductions to the subject. See, e.g., JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION 
TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (Joel Weinsheimer trans., Yale Univ. Press 
1994) (1991); JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS 
METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980). Two excellent 
sources for Ricoeur's work in hermeneutics are PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND 
THE HUMAN SCIENCES (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1981) (1981) [hereinafter RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES] and 
PAUL RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION (Richard Kearney ed. & trans., 
Sage Publications 1996) [hereinafter RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION]. 
Examples of sources addressing legal hermeneutics include: LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) [hereinafter LEGAL 
HERMENEUTICS] and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer I Statutory Interpretation, 
90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990). 
4 See generally, GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 186 
(explaining that interpretation involves a dialogue between text and interpreter). 
This dialogue will be addressed in Part I of this article. 
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this article will suggest that by understanding the role of both 
the text (the mission statement) and the interpreter (the law 
school administration, faculty, students, etcetera) in interpreting 
and effectuating a law school's mission statement, a law school 
can carry out its mission in a way that both maintains the "core 
values" of the mission statement and remains functional in the 
ever-evolving law school environment. 
Two things should be underscored at this juncture. First, 
the hermeneutic theory I am working with in this article is not a 
methodology for reaching objective meaning.5 Those familiar 
with the term have seen it in the context of biblical 
hermeneutics ,6 historical hermeneutics ,7 or romanticist 
hermeneutics,S which imply the possibility of a clear 
methodology to reach objective interpretations.9 An 
underpinning of Gadamerian theory is that there is no absolute 
methodology for interpretation. Instead, interpretation is a 
result of the interaction between the text and the interpreter 
seeking to understand the text.10 While Ricoeur's approach 
differs from Gadamer's in many ways,11 the two approaches 
compliment one another in the present context and in their 
relation to legal thought. 
5 Gadamer rejects the idea that one can use any specific methodology to 
understand a text or glean an objective meaning. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHOD, supra note 3, at 476 (arguing that "objectifying procedures of natural 
science. .. [appear] to be an abstraction when viewed from the medium that 
language is"). But see GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 118 ("[U]nderstanding what is said 
cannot be reduced to a cognizing subject's intellectual comprehension of an 
objectivizable, isolable content."). 
6 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 11-13 (providing a basic overview of the 
history of biblical hermeneutics); see also RUDOLF BULTMANN, FAITH AND 
UNDERSTANDING (Robert W. Funk ed. & Louise Pettibone Smith trans., SCM Press 
Ltd. 1969) (1966) (addressing Bultmann's theological hermeneutics, which while 
addressing biblical issues, are more appropriately considered an aspect of modern 
philosophical hermeneutics). 
7 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 16-26 (providing a basic overview of historical 
hermeneutics); see also Eskridge, supra note 3, at 619-20 (discussing Gadamer's 
critique of historicism). 
8 BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 13-16 (providing a brief overview of romanticist 
hermeneutics and discussing the important role of Schleiermacher who inspired 
Dilthey, one of the most important hermeneutic theorists). Dilthey played a 
significant role in regard to historical hermeneutics. See id. at 19-23. 
9 See id. at 11-26. 
10 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3; see also GRONDIN, supra 
note 3, at 106-37 (providing an overview of Gadamer's work in this area); Eskridge, 
supra note 3, at 614-24 (same). 
11 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 229-35. 
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Second, this article might prove most relevant to schools 
that have had trouble realizing their missions, or have failed to 
do so. It should be particularly useful to those schools that have 
abandoned any realistic attempt to live their mission statements 
because those statements seem out of touch with current 
realities, and have thus become simply lofty goals or 
inspirational statements with little practical significance. There 
are, of course, schools that are able to effectuate their missions 
daily-I happen to teach at one now. It appears that these 
schools engage in some of the give and take that I will discuss 
below,12 at least implicitly, in order to realize their missions over 
time. Even for these schools, the approaches discussed below 
can be useful to help perpetuate this success. Of course, as will 
be seen, the nature of the mission statement itself plays an 
important role in facilitating or complicating this process.13 
1. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TEXT AND CONTEXT: 
GADAMER, RICOEUR, AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING 
The purpose of this section is to provide a basic overview of 
Gadamerian and Ricoeurian hermeneutics.14 Continental 
philosophy can be difficult to penetrate for those with little 
formal training-as this author has personally experienced. It is 
part of a discourse that might, at first, seem alien to many law 
professors and lawyers. One of the goals of this section is to 
bridge this potential gap. Bridging the gap is well worth the 
effort given the major contribution this branch of philosophy has 
to offer, both in terms of the issues discussed herein and other 
issues of concern within the legal and academic communities.15 
In this article, I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive 
discussion of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics or Ricoeur's 
hermeneutic theory. Gadamer's thought is focused on a 
universal concept of "being" far beyond the scope of this article, 16 
12 See infra Part LA. 
13 See infra Parts I.e, II. 
14 It might be more accurate to say that the purpose of this section is to provide 
a basic overview of Gadamerian hermeneutics and to explore those portions of 
Ricoeur's work that mediate some major criticisms of Gadamerian hermeneutics. 
See infra Part LB. As will be explained, Ricoeur's hermeneutic theory is much 
broader than this. See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra 
note 3; RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION, supra note 3, at 51-53. 
15 See LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 3; see also Eskridge, supra note 3. 
16 See generally GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3 (providing a 
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although his construct of interpretation, discussed below, is 
central to his broader work.l7 Ricoeur's hermeneutics involves a 
melding of phenomenology and hermeneutic theory that also 
seeks a broad concept of understanding; this melding, however, 
cannot be addressed or explained adequately in this brief 
article. IS Instead, I will focus on how Ricoeur helps explain and 
mediate some of the concerns raised by Gadamer's theory-
specifically, the concerns raised by Jiirgen Habermas.19 
A. Gadamer 
Gadamer suggests that there is no absolute method of 
interpretation.2o Each interpreter brings his or her own pre-
understandings into the act of interpreting a text or a 
situation.21 Moreover, these pre-understandings are influenced 
by the tradition and social context in which the interpreter 
exists.22 This tradition provides the interpreter with a horizon 
that includes both her obvious predispositions and a range of 
more subtle ones.23 This horizon can be influenced by many 
factors, including the social context in which interpretation 
occurs and the social bias and personal traits of the interpreter-
all of which are influenced by tradition.24 
more in-depth discussion on this subject); see also GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 106-39 
(providing an outstanding overview of Gadamerian hermeneutics). 
17 See GADAMER, TRUTH .AND METHOD, supra note 3. The term "universal" as 
used in this context should not be confused with "foundational." See id. at 256-57, 
350-51 (discussing Heidegger's fundamental ontology and universality of experience 
respectively). 
18 See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS .AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 3; 
RICOEUR, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ACTION, supra note 3. 
19 See PAUL RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, in 
HERMENEUTICS .AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 3, at 63 [hereinafter 
RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology]. 
20 See generally GADAMER, TRUTH.AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 471, 522, 533-
34; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, in GADAMER, 
REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 88, 105 [hereinafter GADAMER, 
Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy]. 
21 See GADAMER, TRUTH .AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 265-71. Gadamer 
suggests that "[t]he concept of 'prejudice' is where [one] can start" when developing 
his or her own hermeneutical theory. Id. at 271. 
22 See id. at 271,533-34; see also Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621-22. 
23 See GADAMER, TRUTH .AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 305 ("To acquire a 
horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand ... in order ... 
to see it better .... "). 
24 See id. at 265-307. 
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Moreover, the text has its own horizon of meaning.25 That 
horizon is influenced by the context or tradition in which it was 
written, factors influencing or interpreting it over the passage of 
time, the words used, and the context of the original author or 
authors.26 Philosophical hermeneutics suggests that to 
understand a text, a give and take must occur between the text 
and the interpreter. It is a dialogue between one's being and the 
object that one seeks to understand.27 This conversation 
transforms both the text and the interpreter as they engage in 
the exchange.28 
The interpreter must necessarily project his or her own 
horizon into the interpretive process and must also reflect upon 
it and the horizon of the text.29 The horizon of the text has a 
binding quality because when an interpreter openly enters into 
dialogue with the text, the horizon of the text will limit the range 
of pre-understandings the interpreter can consistently project.30 
Because the text and the interpreter are engaged in a dialogue to 
reach a common truth, neither the text nor the interpreter are 
the sole source of meaning. 
Unlike some earlier hermeneutic thinkers, Gadamer does 
not seek a scientific methodology for interpreting texts and 
experiences.3! In fact, he sees the quest for such absolute 
methods as interfering with the process of interpret~tion by 
obfuscating what is really occurring. It is not that interpretive 
methodology is useless, but rather that it does not do what it 
purports to do, that is, reach an objective and unquestionable 
meaning. The process of reaching meaning requires a constant 
dialogue between the text or object, and the interpreter. Thus, 
this process contains a subjective element. This subjectivity, 
however, is mediated by tradition.32 
25 See id. at 369-70. , 
26 See id. at 370, 374-75; GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, 
supra note 20, at 98 (suggesting that this may actually be an under-inclusive list). 
27 This dialogue is central to Gadamer's theory of interpretation in TRUTH AND 
METHOD, supra note 3. 
26 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 265-66. 
29 See id. at 267 ("A person who is trying to understand a text is always 
projecting. "). 
30 See id.; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 627. 
31 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
32 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 266-67, 276-77. Use of 
the term "context" instead of tradition, however, is preferred for reasons explained 
below. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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Significantly, Gadamer does not believe that the lack of a 
clear interpretive method prevents one from reaching truth or 
understanding. It simply demonstrates that truth can be 
variable when different texts and interpreters engage in the 
hermeneutic dialogue, or when that dialogue is engaged in over 
time by the same interpreter. Contrary to the suggestions of 
some critics, this is not a form of relativism in which all 
interpretations are seen as equal and correct.33 Interestingly, it 
rejects relativism in the sense that through a proper dialogue 
between the text and the interpreter, one can reach a better 
understanding of the text than one who simply assigns a 
reflexive meaning to the text and does not engage in such 
dialogue. Thus, while there is no clear interpretive method in 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, there is a better method for text and 
interpreter to interact to reach a meaning that is both consistent 
with the text and cognizant of the role the interpreter plays in 
reaching that meaning. 
An illustration from the legal arena will be useful to enable 
the reader to apply this theory to law school missions in the next 
section, and to demonstrate that while this theory may seem 
abstract, it actually has practical significance.34 This example is 
provided by the interpretive concepts of textualism and "plain 
meaning," which are sometimes utilized in constitutional and 
statutory construction. The hermeneutic theory discussed in this 
article suggests that the "plain meaning" of a law may not be 
nearly as "plain" as a court presumes, and that the methods 
ascribed to textualism do not lead to the "true" meaning of the 
text being interpreted-although they may be a useful part of 
the dialogue in appropriate cases. 
This should not come as a shock given the fact that there are 
many cases in which "plain" meaning was divined in a five to 
four opinion of the Supreme Court overturning an opinion of an 
appeals court panel or state supreme COurt.35 In such cases, five 
33 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 142 ("Those who talk about relativism 
presuppose that there could be a truth ,vithout the horizon of this conversation-
that is, an absolute truth separate from our questions."). 
34 Gadamer himself sees hermeneutics as a practical philosophy. See generally 
GADAMER, Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy, supra note 20; HANS-GEORG 
GADAMER, Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task, in GADAMER, REASON 
IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 113. 
35 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 55-63 (1993) 
(documenting a capital punishment case on the interpretation of jury instructions). 
HeinOnline -- 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 738 2000
738 ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW [Vo1.74:731 
Justices may find on the face of a statutory provision that it is 
only subject to one interpretation, despite the fact that four other 
Justices, and a number of lower court judges did not find the 
meaning that was gleaned to be plain.36 Moreover, once plain 
meaning is found, courts generally do not look at legislative 
history, context, or administrative interpretations, even when 
these sources provide direct evidence that the supposedly plain 
meaning was not intended by the authors of the statutory 
provision and is not the most logical interpretation of it in 
context.37 It has been suggested with some force that in these 
cases, plain meaning is used as an allegedly objective 
methodology to justify a decision reached for other reasons. 
Hermeneutic theory seeks to understand these other reasons 
and provide a basis for a dialogue between the judge or judges, 
as interpreter, and the statutory or constitutional provision, as 
text, which will enable a more open and honest interpretation. 
To do so, one must look to the horizon and context/tradition of 
the text, and apply it to the situation at hand-all while 
understanding and acknowledging that in applying it, we are 
mediating it through our own lens, which is influenced by our 
personal contexts and traditions. 
The use of tradition in Gadamerian hermeneutics has been 
the subject of a great deal of controversy.3S After all, if Gadamer 
were suggesting that tradition set the boundaries for 
interpretation, there would be significant limits on the ability of 
those outside a given tradition, or those oppressed and 
marginalized by it, to effectuate change. Jiirgen Habermas has 
criticized Gadamer on this very point.39 Habermas is a 
36 See id. 
37 An excellent example of this is provided by Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 
U.S. 471 (1999). This decision was severely criticized for failing to consider these 
factors in Frank S. Ravitch & Marsha B. Freeman, The Americans With "Certain" 
Disabilities Act: Title I of the ADA and the Supreme Court's Result Oriented 
Jurisprudence, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 119 (2000). 
38 See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-32 (providing a general overview of the 
major attacks on Gadamer's theory). This article will only focus on the controversy 
between Gadamer and Jiirgen Habermas. An excellent overview of this debate is 
contained in BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 152-64, and Jiirgen Habermas, The 
Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 181 [hereinafter 
Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality]. 
39 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 155 (criticizing Gadamer's reluctance to 
engage in abstract thinking); Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, 
supra note 38. 
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proponent of critical hermeneutics and the critique of ideology, 
which seeks, among other things, to understand the role of social 
hierarchy and bias, and to empower people to overcome such 
stratification. As Paul Ricoeur succinctly put it: 
The gesture of hermeneutics is a humble one of acknowledging 
the historical conditions to which all human understanding is 
subsumed in the reign of finitude; that of the critique of 
ideology is a proud gesture of defiance directed against the 
distortions of human communication. By the first, I place 
myself in the historical process to which I know that I belong; 
by the second, I oppose the present state of falsified human 
communication with the idea of an essentially political freedom 
of speech, guided by the limiting idea of unrestricted and 
unconstrained communication.4o 
Therefore, Gadamer's reliance on tradition is naturally 
troubling for Habermas. Indeed, if Habermas' initial concerns 
about Gadamer's use of tradition were accurate, the implications 
would be troubling for many who support Gadamer's approach-
including Gadamer. 
As it turns out, however, Gadamer's use of tradition is not 
nearly as conservative as Habermas initially thought.41 
Gadamer does not see tradition as an insurmountable barrier, 
but rather, as a reality that influences interpretation, one which 
must be understood to effectuate change.42 If one really wants to 
effect change, one must be cognizant of the factors that influence 
the current system-to Gadamer, tradition is the biggest such 
factor. The debate between Gadamer and Habermas forced 
Gadamer to clarify this, and ironically demonstrated that the 
two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive.43 
Ricoeur has done a truly brilliant job of demonstrating this.44 
Thus, "tradition" in the context of Gadamerian hermeneutics 
40 RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 87. 
41 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-35 (explaining the shift; within 
hermeneutic philosophy to include the claim of universality propounded by 
Habermas); see also RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 
19, at 63 (explaining how hermeneutic philosophy goes beyond social science and 
into philosophy in general); Eskridge, supra note 3, at 630-32. 
42 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 269-70 (explaining that 
tradition is part of the understanding of text, not a hindrance). 
43 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 131-33 (stating that Gadamer believed that 
tradition could be used to help understand the current context). 
44 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 
87-100 (explaining the role oftradition in contemporary hermeneutics). 
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is not an absolute boundary to interpretive possibilities. Instead, 
it is a significant factor in shaping the horizons of both the text 
and the interpreter, a factor that is necessarily injected into the 
interpretive process-the dialogue between text and interpreter. 
Gadamer learned this from Heidegger who asserted that "our 
existence is inherently contextual-we are 'thrown' into a pre-
existent world-our understanding is conditioned by the 
traditions of the world into which we are thrown."45 Thus 
[a] person who is trying to understand a text is always 
projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as 
soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text .... [T]he 
initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text 
with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning.46 
The interpreter seeks to work out his pre-understandings in 
light of the text. Thus, the interpreter does not seek to simply 
confirm his pre-understandings, but rather, to determine which, 
if any, of the pre-understandings are consistent with the horizon 
of the text.47 This can only occur through a reflective dialogue 
between the text and the interpreter, where the interpreter is 
willing to give up pre-understandings that do not work out in 
light of the text.48 
Perhaps it is a result of my own horizon when I read 
Gadamer, but I prefer the term "context" to the term "tradition." 
Tradition implies something that necessarily comes from the 
past, but when one reads Gadamer, it is apparent that tradition, 
as he uses that term, is influenced by present context as well.49 
Tradition shapes our present, but present circumstances shape 
the path of tradition. Moreover, in our pluralistic, complex, and 
ever-changing society, with almost unlimited access to 
information, context may be a more accurate term. Like 
Gadamer's use of the term tradition, context includes, but is not 
limited to, our social context, biases, and preferences. Even if it 
is only a matter of semantics, context seems a better term, 
especially in light of the concerns raised by Habermas. 
45 Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621 (citing GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra 
note 3, at 265-71). 
46 GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 267. 
47 See id. at 269 (stating that the reader of the text is waiting for the text to tell 
him something and apply it to what he or she already believes or knows). 
48 See id. at 269 ("The hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of 
things."). 
49 See id. at 266-68. 
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Therefore, in this article I sometimes use the term "context" in 
place of the word "tradition." 
In his wonderful article, Gadamer / Statutory Interpretation, 
William Eskridge, Jr. provides an excellent summary of the 
interpretive dialogue envisioned by Gadamer, noting that 
(j]ust as the horizon of the text changes over time, partly 
through interpretive encounters, so too the interpreter's 
viewpoint, or horizon, is transformed in the encounter. The 
historical conditioning of our understanding does not preclude 
revising our pre-understandings in light of the text. The 
dynamic process of interpretation works thus: Upon our first 
approach to the text, we project our pre-understandings onto it. 
As we learn more about the text, we revise our initial 
projections, better to conform with the presumed integrity of 
the text as it unfolds to us. Essential to the interpreter's 
conversation with the text is her effort to find a common ground 
that will both make sense out of the individual parts of a text 
and integrate them into a coherent whole. The assumption that 
the text has something to teach us, therefore, exercises a 
constraining influence on interpreters. 50 
The dialogue between text and interpreter enables the 
interpreter to shed biases and pre-understandings that are 
inconsistent with the horizon of the text, but the remaining 
horizon of the interpreter has a similar impact on the possible 
meanings of the text. Thus, the dialogue is a two way process: 
The horizon of the interpreter influences the meaning of the text 
and the horizon of the text limits the range of pre-
understandings the interpreter can project that will work out in 
light of the text. 
B. Ricoeur 
As noted above, my discussion of Ricoeur's work will focus 
only upon the ways in which Ricoeur's concept of interpretation 
helps explain and mediate some of the concerns raised by 
Gadamer's theory. Given the purpose of the present discussion, 
this is appropriate, but it is essential to point out that Ricoeur's 
work is much richer and deeper than the small piece of it 
discussed in this article may suggest. 51 If all Paul Ricoeur had 
done in the discourse of hermeneutics was clarify the nature of 
50 Eskridge, supra note 3, at 627. 
51 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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Gadamer's work in light of Habermas' criticisms, and thus to an 
extent, mediate the perceived conflict between philosophical 
hermeneutics and the critique of ideology, his contribution would 
have been significant. 52 This, however, is only a small piece of 
his body of work in this area-a body of work that could be called 
exceptional rather than merely significant. 53 
In mediating the dispute between Habermas and Gadamer, 
it is clear that Ricoeur has significant differences with the 
traditionalism he sees in Gadamerian hermeneutics. 54 He 
acknowledges that this does not make hermeneutics inherently 
conservative and tradition-preserving, nor does it make it a bar 
to an emancipatory goal.55 Habermas' critique of Gadamer 
suggests that the role of tradition in his hermeneutics precludes 
a critique of ideology, for if we are constrained by our tradition in 
interpreting the world around us, we will not see the oppression 
wrought by our ideology.56 Ricoeur explains that this 
supposed tension may be nothing more than a "straw-man;" 
in fact, philosophical hermeneutics and its focus upon 
tradition may not conflict with a critique of ideology and 
emancipatory goalS.57 
In addressing this supposed conflict, Ricoeur initially notes: 
I hasten to say that no plan of annexation, no syncretism, will 
preside over this debate. I readily admit, along with Gadamer, 
that each of the two theories speaks from a different place; but 
I hope to show that each can recognise the other's claim to 
universality in a way which marks the place of one in the 
structure of the other. 58 
Later in the same essay, Ricoeur addresses why it may be 
consistent to focus upon the past and cultural 
influence/tradition, as well as an ideology of emancipation from 
the domination of oppressive ideologies: 
52 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 
87-100 (indicating that each school of thought raises its own legitimate claims). 
53 See BLEICHER, supra note 3, at 217-56 (explaining the importance of 
Ricoeur's work and including a translation of one of his works). 
54 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 
87-95. 
55 See id. at 87-100. 
56 See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-35; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 630-32. 
57 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 
96-97. 
58 Id. at 64. 
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The task of the hermeneutics of tradition is to remind the 
critique of ideology that man can project his emancipation and 
anticipate an unlimited and unconstrained communication only 
on the basis of the creative reinterpretation of cultural 
heritage. If we had no experience of communication, however 
restricted and mutilated it was, how could we wish it to prevail 
for all men and at all institutional levels of the social nexus? It 
seems to me that critique can be neither the first instance nor 
the last. Distortions can be criticised only in the name of a 
consensus which we cannot anticipate merely emptily, in the 
manner of a regulative idea, unless that idea is exemplified; 
and one of the very places of exemplification of the ideal of 
communication is precisely our capacity to overcome cultural 
distance in the interpretation of works received from the past. 
He who is unable to reinterpret his past may also be incapable 
of projecting concretely his interest in emancipation. 59 
743 
If, as Ricoeur suggests, we engage in a "creative 
reinterpretation" of our cultural heritage, the implications for 
present purposes are significant. In the course of the dialogue 
between text and interpreter,60 the law school community, as 
interpreters, might reinterpret the mission statement in light of 
some overriding concern with the ideology underlying it. If such 
a creative reinterpretation were totally inconsistent with the 
horizon of the text, this would directly conflict with Gadamer's 
approach, but as Ricoeur implies, the horizon of the 
interpreter(s) may allow for creative reinterpretation of a text 
that is consistent with both its horizon and current social 
concerns, and which may call into question the ideology 
underlying the text. 
The debate between Habermas and Gadamer, and Ricoeur's 
attempt to demonstrate common ground, are far less important 
in the context of law school mission statements. It is 
worthwhile, however, to include this discussion of Ricoeur 
because a discussion of Gadamerian hermeneutics is likely to 
raise some of the concerns expressed by Habermas. Because few 
in the legal community are familiar with Gadamer, it is 
important to anticipate and address such concerns with his 
emphasis on tradition in advance because, as he and Ricoeur 
point out, that emphasis is not at all inconsistent with change or 
59 ld. at 97. 
60 It should be noted here that Ricoeur does not necessarily see the process of 
interpreting a written text as one of dialogue. See id. at 91. 
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emancipatory goals. In fact, the hermeneutic approach might 
facilitate those goals. As noted in the preceding paragraph, this 
creates a broader conception of the possibilities opened up by the 
interpretive process than that which a reader might experience if 
she were only exposed to Gadamer's initial framing of the 
concept in Truth and Method.61 Again, quoting Ricoeur: 
"[N]othing is more deceptive than the alleged antinomy between 
an ontology of prior understanding and an eschatology of 
freedom [between Gadamer's concept of the role of tradition and 
Habermas' focus upon overcoming oppression and domination]. 
We have encountered these false antinomies elsewhere: as if it 
were necessary to choose between reminiscence and hope!"62 
C. The Implications of Hermeneutic Theory in the Present 
Context 
Hermeneutic theory is ideal for understanding the failure of 
many schools to realize their missions, and it also provides a 
means for interpreting those missions in order to enable their 
realization in the modern context. Some schools may have 
mission statements that, at least on paper, seem out of touch 
with the current realities facing the law school, its faculty, and 
students.63 In addition, outside influences such as accrediting 
bodies may affect the ways in which schools carry out their 
missions.64 Indeed, if schools look at the text of a mission 
statement alone, the stated mission might seem impossible to 
achieve, out of date, or overly broad in the world of the twenty-
first century law school. This may lead to a view that the 
mission statement is simply advisory or an unattainable "wish-
list" of sorts. 
When a school operates day-to-day while ignoring the 
existence of its mission, that school has lost an opportunity to 
define itself, its goals, and the changes it wants to make in the 
world and in the lives of its faculty and students. This latter 
point is especially important for religious schools, regardless of 
61 In this regard it should be noted that Gadamer himself opposed such a 
cramped conception of the interpretive process. See GRONDIN, supra note 3, at 129-
35. 
62 RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 100. 
63 See generally Barkan, supra note 1. 
64 See id. at 249 (suggesting this influence is a factor to one degree or another, 
with some seeing it as a factor secondary to more informal challenges facing these 
schools). 
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whether the mission reflects a specific religious heritage or 
simply a distinct ethical commitment.65 
Through the give and take between the mission text and the 
text's interpreter (the current law school administrator, 
professor, or student), a mission can be revitalized by 
maintaining its core values, while at the same time avoiding 
unnecessary conflict with the horizon of the interpreter. The 
interpreter is prevented from ignoring the text of the mission 
statement by the horizon of the text, but at the same time can 
interpret the mission statement so that it is consistent with 
evolving social context and reality.66 In this way, a school can 
realize its mission even as times change. The mission does not 
become obsolete because it is not textually absolute. 
Another implication of hermeneutic theory to law school 
mission statements involves the drafting or revision of mission 
statements. In writing the text of a mission statement, a school 
is shaping, although not absolutely determining, the horizon of 
the mission statement. Naturally, the drafters of mission 
statements are careful about the goals they seek to express. If 
they draft a statement too narrowly, it might be ignored after 
time for the reasons set forth in the next section. Conversely, if 
it is drafted too broadly, the horizons of different interpreters 
over the years could easily lead to interpretations inconsistent 
with the drafter's core objectives-from a hermeneutic 
perspective, there is nothing necessarily wrong with this. The 
drafters should consider focusing on the core values they seek to 
infuse into the mission, and draft the statement so that these 
core values infuse it throughout; yet it should be drafted broadly 
enough to allow the manner in which those values are realized to 
change over time.67 
An excellent example of the requisite balance is the Barry 
University mission statement. It contains a core of important 
65 By "distinct ethical commitment," I mean a mISSIOn statement at a 
religiously affiliated law school that does not reflect a sectarian mission, but does 
reflect a religious dimension and/or a distinct commitment to ethics and making the 
world a better place. 
66 See supra Part LA. 
67 While the passage of tinIe and the horizon of future interpreters might alter 
the intended meaning of the drafters, if those drafters understand the hermeneutic 
dialogue that will be engendered by the text, they can try to shape the horizon of the 
text in a manner that will project a somewhat consistent conception of core values 
into future dialogues with interpreters. 
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values such as a commitment to ethics, serving the under-served, 
a religious dimension, and so forth. Furthermore, the mission 
statement is worded broadly enough to allow these goals to be 
achieved in a variety of ways as times change and pluralism 
increases.68 This enables the core values to be an inescapable 
aspect of the horizon of the text while allowing interpreters with 
differing horizons to understand the text and make it their own 
over time.69 The way the core values are lived and effectuated 
may change, but those changes do not erase the core values 
themselves. While some of the words of the mission statement 
could be subject to a much narrower reading, the text as a whole 
and the horizons of those who have interpreted it over the years 
make such a reading inconsistent with the text as a whole. 
While Barry is a Catholic university, the ethical 
commitment and religious dimension reflected in the mission 
statement are augmented by a commitment to diversity that 
enables the school to welcome faculty and students from a 
diverse array offaiths or no faith at all. We share a commitment 
to ethical behavior and helping those in need, and our diversity 
enhances these goals. Thus, while I am Jewish and rather 
liberal, I am, along with all my colleagues, part of Barry's 
inclusionary mission. We are not marginalized-that would be 
inconsistent with the caring environment aspect of the mission. 
Thus, despite our differing horizons, we can "live the mission" 
68 The core of the Barry University Mission Statement is as follows: "The 
primary purpose of Barry University, as stated in the Charter, is to offer students a 
quality education. Furthermore, Barry commits itself to assuring a religious 
dimension and to providing community service and presence within a more caring 
environment." Barry University Mission (visited Feb. 1, 2001) 
<http://www.barry.eduiAbout-BU/misaccre.htm>. 
69 A recent example ofthis is the addition of the law school to Barry University. 
The law school is diverse both in terms of students and faculty. A number of the 
faculty and students, including myself, are not Catholic or even Christian. We can 
embrace the mission, however, because from the start it was clear that Barry is less 
concerned about what faith you are than about how you live your life. Do you really 
care about making a difference in the community through your scholarship, 
teaching, community service, or the like? Do you really care about providing a 
quality legal education to your students and fostering a caring environment? These 
are the questions that matter most, and the mission is interpreted to foster 
creativity and diversity in the ways the mission is carried out. There has been 
tremendous support for the clinical program and community service activities, and 
the law school greatly encourages scholarship. For example, when one writes an 
article that has the potential to help someone down the road, or engages in pro bono 
work, or simply takes some extra time to help a struggling student, she is thereby 
contributing to the mission. 
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because of its inherent flexibility and the fact that the school has 
continued to interpret the mission in a manner that maintains 
the core values with such flexibility. Barry University, along 
with other schools that successfully realize the ideals embodied 
in their mission statements, is instinctively engaging in the 
hermeneutic dialogue. 
II. APPLYING HERMENEUTIC THEORY TO REALIZE THE 
IDEALS CONTAINED IN LAW SCHOOL MISSION 
STATEMENTS 
At the First Conference of the Religiously Affiliated Law 
Schools, held at Marquette University Law School in 1994, a 
number of the participants pointed out the difficulties faced by 
law schools, particularly religiously affiliated law schools, in 
realizing their core missions.7o Some focused on internal 
pressures such as economic concerns or shifts in the orientation 
of faculty, administration, and students.71 Others focused on 
external pressures such as the requirements of accrediting 
bodies, the larger university community, and the views of 
peers.72 All of these factors could easily contribute to a school's 
failure to realize its mission, especially if that mission is 
perceived as being at odds with the current situation facing the 
school. As I will suggest below, however, this need not be the 
case, because the core values underlying the mission statement 
may be realized if the mission statement is approached from a 
hermeneutic perspective. 
One caveat that should be noted here is that the suggestions 
70 See generally, Symposium on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 78 MARQ. L. 
REV. 247 (1995). 
71 See Lynn R. Buzzard, A Christian Law School: Images and Vision, 78 MARQ. 
L. REv. 267 (1995) (discussing how factors relating to identity and those relating to 
environment are crucial in realizing the vision of a Christian law school, which is 
usually distorted by each person's own perception of what a Christian law school 
should be); Douglas Laycock, Academic Freedom, Religious Commitment, and 
Religious Integrity, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1995) (discussing methods the schools 
could employ to prevent shifts in faculty); Steven R. Smith, Accreditation and 
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 361 (1995) (discussing how the 
accreditation process affects religiously affiliated schools through affirmative action 
and other programs). 
72 See Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation: What's "Religious 
Diversity" Got To Do With It?, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 427 (1995) (focusing specifically on 
accrediting bodies). Other symposium participants considered accrediting bodies as 
a secondary issue. See Buzzard, supra note 71; Laycock, supra note 71; Smith, supra 
note 71. 
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below might not be as useful for a religious institution with a 
highly sectarian mission statement that is in tension with 
modernity, and the issues facing law schools in the twenty-first 
century. In such a case, the mission statement will foreclose 
some of the give and take between text and interpreter.73 Of 
course, the hermeneutic thought discussed in this article might 
be useful even in the context of such a limiting mission 
statement. While my application of hermeneutic theory in this 
section helps to moderate between the interpreter living in the 
present and a broadly designed text that may have been created 
under a very different set of conditions, it could still moderate 
between a much narrower text and the modern interpreter. 
From a hermeneutic perspective, there are several key 
possibilities that might explain why so many law schools have 
trouble realizing their missions. One of the most obvious is the 
absolute failure of dialogue between text and interpreter. If law 
school administrators and others within the law school 
community see the school's mission statement as out of touch 
with current reality, they may simply ignore it. It then becomes 
merely words on paper. If the law school community does not 
engage in a dialogue with the text, there will be no opportunity 
to glean the core values embodied in the mission statement or 
their possible relevance to the school's current situation. Instead 
of exploring whether there is a way to effectuate the core values 
of the mission statement in light of the horizon of the modern 
law school, the school will take the path of least resistance, and 
over time, the mission statement becomes irrelevant. 
Another possibility is that the school does remember its 
mission, and instead of attempting to engage in an ongoing 
dialogue with the mission statement to carry it on through time, 
the school sees it as an unattainable "wish list," or as simply a 
suggestion. Perhaps even more cynically, a school may see it as 
nothing more than a marketing tool. Such a school may 
sometimes act consistently with its mission, but there is no 
concerted attempt to realize that mission or to understand the 
73 This give and take will be foreclosed unless the interpreter seeks to 
"creatively reinterpret" the mission statement because of a concern that it embodies 
an ideology inconsistent with the current goals of the school and/or social 
conscience, and the horizon of the text does not foreclose the possibility of such a 
creative reinterpretation (which would require an exceptionally narrow and closed 
ended text). See supra text accompanying notes 59-62 (discussing creative 
reinterpretation in the context of the HabermaslGadamer debate). 
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possibilities it opens up. This may be because the "wish list" 
seems impossible to achieve given the current realities facing the 
school. Yet, as Gadamer suggests, only a rigid reading of the 
text would preclude its horizon and that of the school from 
coming together to give the text life despite ever-changing 
circumstances.74 There is nothing inconsistent with a mission 
statement that is effectuated differently over time, so long as the 
core values are realized. There is also nothing wrong with 
reinterpreting those core values as the distance of time sheds 
additional light on the possible range of meanings presented by 
the text's horizon.75 The key is that neither the text nor the 
interpreter can be taken out of the search for meaning. 
Unfortunately, because the current context facing a school 
might make the text of the mission statement seem alien, or 
unattainable, there may be no ongoing dialogue between the text 
and the interpreter. The text may be seen as absolute and 
problematic. For example, the current law school community, 
including administrators, faculty, and students, may feel the 
mission statement must be interpreted based on the intent of its 
drafters who are known to have had a more narrow view of its 
meaning. This historically embedded belief may be projected 
into the text and limit the possibilities the text could otherwise 
open up. 
All of this suggests why so many schools have not realized 
their missions over time. illtimately, when the interpreter does 
not interact with the text, or views the text as outdated, useless, 
or simply suggestive, it is easier to overlook the text altogether if 
it appears to conflict with issues and context currently 
confronting the interpreter. If, however, law schools, including 
faculty, students, and administrators, are able to engage in a 
give and take with the text, that text may be revitalized and 
useful without losing its core aspirations. 
What might this process look like? As suggested above, 
when the interpreter initially engages with the text, the 
interpreter is likely to project his or her pre-understandings onto 
it,76 including biases that mission statements are not terribly 
important, up to date, or practical. At the same time, the 
74 See supra Part LA. 
75 See GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 3, at 297-99. 
76 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text; see also supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
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interpreter may hold other pre-understandings, that is, goals he 
or she wants the school to achieve that may seem to conflict with 
the mission. This includes concerns about current problems in 
the local community, nationally, or internationally, that need to 
be addressed, a view of the world that values diversity or does 
not, etcetera. After carefully reviewing and reflecting upon the 
text, the pre-understandings initially projected onto the text may 
be revised if they do not agree with the text as it unfolds to the 
interpreter.77 The interpreter must seek to find a common 
ground with the text.78 In doing so, the interpreter's other pre-
understandings might find some consistency with underlying 
values inherent in the mission statement when it is viewed as a 
"coherent whole." 
If there are parts of a statement that seem to conflict with 
the horizon of the interpreter and the meaning of the statement 
when read as whole, the interpreter will seek to integrate them 
into the coherent whole. The interpreter will try to find some 
common ground that allows the interpretation to proceed.79 If 
this can not be done, the interpreter may need to reevaluate the 
basis for common ground with the text and continue the dialogue 
to reach such a goal. Even if the statement seems to embody an 
ideology inconsistent with the goals of the school or one that 
might marginalize groups that the school seeks to welcome, the 
text could be creatively reinterpreted by exposing and rejecting 
the imposing ideology. At the same time, it may discover and 
effectuate other values that are consistent with the school's 
current horizon and social conscience. In this case, as Ricoeur 
suggested, by critically evaluating the "tradition," the interpreter 
can identify and challenge the oppressive ideology embodied in 
it,80 and through creative reinterpretation, continue the life of 
the text. If the mission statement turns out to be truly incapable 
of standing on common ground with the interpreter's horizon, it 
could be amended, still rendering the dialogue pro ductive. 81 
77 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See RICOEUR, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, supra note 19, at 
97. 
81 The interaction between text and interpreter will have found a meaning for 
the text that requires amendment to fulfill the school's mission as viewed by the 
interpreter, in this case, the interpretive community ofthe school. Still, the mission 
statement will have been acknowledged and thought about. The end result will be a 
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The text constrains the possible range of interpretations the 
interpreter can give the mission statement, but the horizon of 
the interpreter may expand the possibilities created by the 
text.82 Thus, the process of dialogue between the law school and 
its mission statement can open up possibilities for realizing the 
stated mission that would not have seemed possible if the 
statement were viewed as textually absolute, either because of 
the perceived intent of its drafters or the words used. It is 
axiomatic in the philosophical hermeneutic context that the 
subjective intent of, or the words used by, the drafters does not 
absolutely dictate the possibilities opened up by the text.83 .The 
text must be interpreted in such a way to give it life, and in the 
act of interpretation both the text and the interpreter are 
transformed.84 Therefore, law school missions can be realized 
differently over time. 
This is not simply theory. Think about a school that has 
made no effort to realize its stated mission in recent years. It 
may be doing some things consistent with that mission, but it 
has not directly sought to fulfill it. If the school continues to 
ignore the mission, it loses the opportunity to interpret it, but if 
the school seeks to engage its mission in dialogue, it may find 
consistency between some of its institutional values/concerns 
and those reflected in the mission. From this common ground, 
the school can continue the dialogue with its mission statement 
so that the core values embodied therein can be effectuated in 
the school's current context. The result may not be exactly what 
the drafters of the statement intended yet it could still be 
consistent with their underlying intent. Because the drafters 
may not have foreseen the factors influencing the school's 
horizon, there is no reason their specific intent should govern the 
dialogue.85 Rather their broader intent, the core values, may be 
realized over time.86 If nothing else, the process of engaging the 
new mission statement capable of being carried out; a mission statement that may 
have never come into existence but for the dialogue between its predecessor and the 
interpretive community. 
82 See supra Part I.A. 
83 See supra Part I.A; Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-25. 
84 See supra Part I.A. 
85 See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 624-25. This is also reflected in Gadamer's 
understanding of the dialogue between text and interpreter, temporal distance, and 
"meta-intent." Id. 
86 See id. 
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mission statement in dialogue of the sort envisioned by Gadamer 
should stimulate ideas and foster constructive discourse. 
CONCLUSION 
A world of possibilities opens up when schools actively seek 
to engage in dialogue with their mission statements. As 
Gadamer suggested, an interpreter must be willing to engage the 
text in dialogue in order to understand it. In the context of law 
school mission statements, such dialogue would be useful 
because it will force each school to think about its mission and 
what it means, and can mean, to the school today. As Gadamer 
might say, the dialogue would unfold the world of possibilities 
raised by the text. Moreover, the dialogue will enable schools 
grappling with the task of realizing their missions over time to 
determine what those missions mean both in light of the text of 
the mission statement and the continually evolving context of 
the school. 
Schools that have not tried to realize their missions might 
find the concepts described herein a useful way to begin the 
process. For those that have partially realized their missions, 
the hermeneutic approach offers the possibility of understanding 
those missions better, so that they can be further realized 
despite changing circumstances and dynamics. Finally, for 
schools that are effectively realizing their missions, hermeneutic 
philosophy provides the hope of continued realization of those 
aspirations well into the future. One thing is certain, if schools 
do not interact at all with their mission statements, those 
statements are mere words on paper, and will almost certainly 
never be realized. 
